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UNDER THE UNDISPUTED FACTS OF THIS CASE WATKINS, 
WHO WAS ALREADY IN A CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIP WITH 
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AS A MATTER OF LAW. 18 
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"ten listed qualified companies". 25 
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in 
UNDER THE UNDISPUTED FACTS AS WERE BEFORE THE 
DISTRICT COURT PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLED TO PARTIAL SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT ON IT'S CONTRACTUAL CLAIMS AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
A. 
The letter agreement between Watkins and the Plaintiff 
dated March 12, 1986 is a valid and binding finder's 
agreement or contract Between the Plaintiff and the 
Defendants and was a binding agreement at the time 
TSI purchased all of the stock of Won-Door. 
B. 
Defendants, by the conduct of their own agent, 
Reed Watkins, are estopped to deny (i) the validity 
of the March 12 Agreement, and (ii) that a fee based 
upon a reasonable application of the March 12, 
Agreement is due Republic. 
C. 
The Plaintiff was in fact the procuring cause 
of the sale of the shareholder's stock in Won-Door 
to TSI and Plaintiff is entitled to a commission as 
reasonably contemplated under the terms of the 
March 12 Agreement between Plaintiff and Defendants. 
IV 
THERE ARE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT AS TO PLAINTIFF'S 
CLAIM THAT WATKINS' STOOD IN A CONFIDENTIAL RELATION 
WITH THE PLAINTIFF OR THAT WATKINS COMMITTED ACTUAL 
FRAUD IN HIS DEALINGS WITH THE PLAINTIFF. 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This appeal was initially incorrectly filed with this Court on November 4, 1991 (910721-
CA). On January 27, 1992 this appeal was transferred to the Utah Supreme Court. On May 
26, 1992 the Utah Supreme Court poured-over this appeal to this Court for disposition. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Considering the facts in a light most favorable to the Respondent, did the trial court err 
in finding that there is no genuine issue of material fact the existence of which would entitle 
Appellant to judgment against the Respondents as a matter of law. Inasmuch as summary 
judgment by definition does not resolve factual issues, a challenge to summary judgment presents 
for review only questions of law and no particular deference is given to the trial court. (See 
Rule 56 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Transamerica v. Dixie Power 789 P.2d 24, 25 (Utah 
1990)) 
More particularly, considering the facts in a light most favorable to the Appellant: 
1. Did the trial court err in finding that as a matter of law the August 22, 1986 
handwritten agreement (App. p. 16) was the controlling and binding agreement between the 
parties (R. p. 415) 
2. Under the circumstance of this case did Watkins have a duty of good faith and fair 
dealing in his dealings with the Appellant and particular in negotiating the August 22, 1986 hand 
written agreement: 
3. Did Watkins breach his duty of good faith and fair dealing in negotiating the 
August 22, 1996 had written agreement by: 
1 
a. Failing to disclose to Appellant that he was in serious negotiation for the 
sale of all of the stock of Won-Door with one of Appellant's previously disclosed contacts (TSI); 
b. Misrepresenting that he was not negotiating with any of Appellant's 
contacts other than Luecadia: 
c. Requiring Appellant to limit it's fee to ten contacts, ostensibly pursuant 
to the requirements of an agreement entered into by Watkins with a third party (Boettcher 
Agreement; App p. 2-7) subsequent to his agreement with Appellant and without approval of the 
Appellant and ait time when Appellant had contacted more than ten companies for the purpose 
of finding a buyer of all of the stock of Won-Door at Watkin's request; 
d. Dealing directly with principles of the Appellant despite request from 
Appellant's attorney to deal with him. 
4. Considering the facts in a light most favorable to the Respondant, did the trial 
court err as matter of law in impliedly finding that there is no genuine issue of material fact the 
existence of which would entitle the Appellant to paritial summary judgment against the 
Respondents. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In this case Appellant-Plaintiff Republic claims that the Defendants-Respondents owe it 
a finders fee for finding a buyer (Thermal Systems Inc also known a TSI) that eventually 
purchased all the stock of Defendant-Respondent Won-Door Corporation for $39,750,000 in cash 
and securities. The Complaint in this matter was filed on June 14, 1988 (R. p.2 ). Defendants 
2 
E R R A T U M 
(pursuant to Rule 24, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure) 
INSERT THE FOLLOWING ON PAGE 2, IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES AND RULES 
Inasmuch as summary judgment by definition does not resolve factual issues, a challenge 
to summary judgment presents for review only questions of law and no particular deference is 
given to the trial court. Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and Transamerica v. Dixie 
Power. 789 P.2d 24, 25 (Utah 1990). 
filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on September 11, 1990 (R. p. 97 ). Plaintiff filed a 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on or about October 16, 1990 (R. p. 492 ). On October 
30, 1999 Won-Door filed a Motion to Strike asking the court to strike various portions of the 
Affidavits of Irvin D. Bird, Mark McSwain and Bryant Cragan which where submitted by 
Republic in support of it's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and in opposition to 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. p. 198). Oral argument on these motions was 
presented to Judge Scott Daniels on August 12, 1991. At the conclusion of the hearing Judge 
Daniels without stating his reasoning beyond the fact the he felt Plaintiff claims were "thin" 
Judge Daniels granted Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. The Order granting 
defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment was entered on November 4, 1991 and another copy 
of the same Order was entered again on November 5, 1991 (R. pp 329-33). This is an appeal 
from the District Court's Order granting Summary Judgment in favor of the Defendants and 
effectively denying Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
As evidenced from the Record before the District Court the following are the undisputed 
facts: 
1. Reed A. Watkins, Esq. ("Watkins"), by virtue of a letter published on February 
20, 1986 by Won-Door Corporation1 entitled "To Whom It May Concern" (the "Agency 
Letter") was the express agent of defendants Won-Door and its shareholders for the purpose of 
1
 R. p. 279 (letter from Jay A. Smart, President of Won-Door authorizing and directing 
attorney Reed A. Watkins to locate a source of funding for the company). 
3 
locating "ftinding for Won-Door by means of initial public offering or private placement of 
stock." 
Under the terms of the Agency Letter, Watkins had the authority to contract, if he saw fit, for 
the sale of all of the outstanding stock of Won-Door Corporation ("Won-Door"). 
2. In early 1986, Watkins contacted Irvin Bird, a long standing personal friend, 
business associate and former client of Watkins' law firm, and asked Bird to help him raise 
funds for Won-Door or its shareholders. Watkins thereafter engaged The Republic Group 
("Republic") as a finder of ftinding for Won-Door and its shareholders.2 
3. Watkins delivered a letter dated March 12, 1986 ("March 12 Agreement"),3 
confirming that Won-Door and its shareholders agreed to engage Republic as the finder of a 
purchaser of 176,000 shares of outstanding stock of Won-Door at a total purchase price 
$7,392,000.00 ($42.00 per share). "Upon the completion of such ftinding arrangement with 
Republic's contact(s), the commission of $250,000.00 would be paid to Republic." The letter 
also required that Republic, to avoid confusion, submit the names of "qualified contacts" to 
Watkins.4 
4. Shortly after the March 12 Agreement, Republic informed Watkins that it had 
become apparent that there was little or no interest in purchasing a minority position (22%) of 
2
 See Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, R pp. 101-
157; Affidavit of Irvin Bird. R. pp 474-486. 
3
 See R. p. 17. 
4
 Id. 
4 
a closely held family corporation and asked Watkins for authority to contact for the purpose in 
obtaining offers for all, or a controlling interest, of Won-Door's outstanding stock.5 
In later March and early April 1986 Reed Watkins authorized Republic to contact potential 
purchasers for the purpose of obtaining offers from companies willing to purchase all of Won-
Door's outstanding stock.6 
5. During March, April, May, June, July and August of 1986, with Watkin's 
knowledge and encouragement, Republic contacted twenty to thirty different companies for the 
express purpose of obtaining an offer to purchase all of Won-Door's outstanding stock. The 
companies contacted by Republic included National Corp. (hereinafter ""), Drexel Burnham & 
Lambert, and Thermal Systems, Inc., (hereinafter, "TSI").7 
6. From approximately March 1986 through August 1986, Watkins met with several 
companies introduced by Republic for the express purpose of negotiating a sale of all of Won-
Door's stock. The principals of Republic and Watkins jointly met with (early April 1986), a 
Salt Lake City based New York Stock Exchange listed company owned by Salt Lake 
5
 Deposition of Irvin Bird Vol. I, at page 15 & 21; Affidavit of Irvin Bird; Affidavit of 
Mark McSwain. R. pp. 474-486, R. pp. 180-188. 
6
 Deposition of Irvin Bird, Vol. I, pages 1 9 - 2 5 , and Exhibit 8, thereof. See also, 
Affidavit of Irvin Bird; Affidavit of Mark McSwain. 
7
 R. pp. 281-283 Exhibits "C" and "D" See also, Deposition of Irvin Bird, Vol. I, pages 
41 &64. 
5 
businessman Ian Cumming, and Drexel Burnham & Lambert (May 8, 1986), at the time the 
largest merger or acquisition oriented brokerage firm in the United States.8 
7. In March or April, 1986, prior to any contact between Won-Door and TSI, 
Republic presented information to Watkins concerning TSI for the purpose of selling all of Won-
Door's stock. Although Republic, in the exercise of its good judgment (specifically in a 
discussion between Bird and Watkins) attempted to warn and discourage Watkins from doing 
business with TSI, it is undisputed that Republic contacted TSI on behalf of Won-Door 
concerning a possible buy-out of 100% of Won-Door's stock in March or April of 1986 and 
was, in fact, the procuring cause of the sale of Won-Door's outstanding stock to TSI.9 
8. On or about April 28, 1986, Watkins, without notice to Republic and despite the 
fact that Republic (at Watkins' request) continued to contact and solicit offers from various 
companies to purchase all of Won-Door's stock, entered into a second finder's agreement with 
Boettcher & Company (hereinafter, the "Boettcher Agreement").10 In paragraph 6. of the 
Boettcher Agreement, Watkins acknowledged that Won-Door had previously contacted other 
companies through another finder. Pursuant to the Boettcher Agreement, Watkins agreed 
without notice to Republic that a maximum of ten of these companies would be excluded from 
the Boettcher Agreement. The Agreement, provided that Boettcher would receive a fee of 
8
 See Deposition of Irvin Bird, Vol. I, page 41. 
9
 Deposition of Irvin Bird, Vol. I, pages 60-61. See also, Affidavit of Irvin Bird, Affidavit 
of Mark McSwain and Affidavit of Bryant Cragun. R. pp. 474-486, 180-188, 189-195. 
10
 R. pp.287-292. The letter agreement between Boettcher & Company and Won-Door 
Corporation. 
6 
$25,000.00 if a transaction was concluded with one of the ten excluded companies. The 
Boettcher Agreement further stated that Boettcher would receive its full fee in the event of a sale 
of Won-Door to any company not on the list of ten exclusions. 
9. Watkins did not disclose the existence of the April 28, 1986 agreement with 
Boettcher (Boettcher Agreement) to Republic until late May, 1986, even though subsequent to 
April 28, 1986, (and prior to Watkins' disclosure to Republic that he had entered into an 
agreement with Boettcher) Watkins continued to meet with Republic on a regular basis to review 
their progress in finding a buyer and encouraged Republic to continue its efforts to find a buyer 
of all of Won-Door's stock. Watkins, also continued to meet with potential purchasers (i.e. 
Drexel, Burnham & Lambert - May 8, 1986) brought to Watkins by Republic after he had 
entered into an agreement with Boettcher.11 
10. Watkins refused to disclose to Republic at any time any of the terms of the 
Boettcher Agreement, with the exception that Watkins stated that his agreement required 
Republic to provide a list of ten companies contacted by Republic to be listed as exclusions to 
the agreement.12 The only full disclosure of the terms of the Boettcher Agreement to Republic 
came during the deposition of Irvin Bird in this case, when the Boettcher Agreement was 
produced for the first time. 
11
 Deposition of Irvin Bird, Vol. I, page 27. 
12
 Deposition of Irvin Bird, Vol. I, pages 41-44. 
7 
11. On May 21, 1986, Republic submitted a list of eleven qualified companies to 
Watkins.13 On May 27, 1986, Republic submitted a second list of fifteen additional qualified 
companies contacted by Republic on behalf of Won-Door.14 
12. The list of May 27 reflected that Republic had contacted TSI on behalf of Won-
Door and its shareholders. 
13. From the time Republic learned of the Boettcher agreement in late May and 
continuing until August 22, 1986, the principles of Republic, on repeated occasions, informed 
Watkins that (i) Republic did not recognize that Watkins' undisclosed agreement with Boettcher 
was binding on Republic; (ii) that Republic had no duty to limit its fee to a list of ten companies; 
(iii) that Republic's fee should not be limited to any list of ten even if Republic submitted such 
a list; (iv) that the May 21 list was not the "list of ten" for the purposes of the Boettcher 
agreement and (v) if one of Republic contacts purchased all of Won-Door's stock Republic 
would be entitled to its fee regardless of the undisclosed terms of Watkins' agreement with 
Boettcher, particularly when Republic had, both prior and subsequent to Watkins' agreement 
with Boettcher & Co., contacted and sent brochures to approximately thirty companies at 
Watkins' direction.15 
14. Independent of the undisclosed terms of Watkins' agreement with Boettcher, 
Republic was required to submit names of "qualified companies" to Watkins under the express 
13
 R. p. 281. 
14
 R. pp. 282-83. 
15
 Deposition of Irvin Bird (detailed discussion throughout all of Volume I). 
8 
requirements of the last paragraph of the March 12 Agreement between Watkins and Republic 
to "avoid confusion concerning Republics contacts".16 
15. Paragraph 6 of the Boettcher Agreement specifically required that the list of "ten 
exclusions" be submitted to Boettcher not later than May 7, 1986.17 No list of ten exclusions 
(or any other number) was ever submitted to Boettcher by Watkins or any one else at Won-
Door. Nor is any list submitted to Watkins by Republic, including the May 21, list of eleven 
qualified companies or the May 27, list of fifteen qualified companies, found in Boettcher's files. 
16. From approximately May until August 22, 1986, there were continuing 
discussions between Watkins and Republic concerning contacts that Republic was continuing to 
make with various companies on behalf of Won-Door and its shareholders with a view toward 
obtaining an offer for the purchase of all of the outstanding stock of Won-Door at Watkins' 
direction.18 
17. During the months of March, April, May, June, July and August, 1986, officers 
of Republic had increasingly frequent discussions with Watkins concerning the need to clarify 
the fee arrangement with Republic under the March 12 Agreement, inasmuch as Republic was 
continuing its efforts to find a buyer for 100% of Won-Door's stock rather than a 22% minority 
16
 R. p. 122. 
17
 R. pp. 287-292. 
18
 Deposition of Irvin Bird (detailed discussion throughout all of Volume I). 
9 
of the outstanding stock and Won-Door appeared to be moving towards an agreement with 
Leucadia, one of Republic's contacts, for a sale of all of Won-Door's stock.19 
18. Watkins at no time stated or otherwise indicated that Republic should not be 
entitled to a fee under the March 12 Agreement, and that in fact reassured Republic that it would 
receive a fee under the March 12 Agreement. Watkins, when asked by Bird to clarify the fee 
provision of the March 12 Agreement made such statements to Mr. Bird as "Irv, we have been 
friends for thirty years, trust me, you will get your fee."20 
19. Commencing in April, 1986 and continuing until August 25, 1986, Watkins, on 
behalf of the shareholders of Won-Door, conducted serious negotiations with Leucadia for the 
purchase of all of the stock of Won-Door.21 
20. At least as early as July, 1986, without the knowledge of Republic, Reed Watkins 
entered into negotiations with TSI which eventually culminated with TSI's purchase of Won-
Door.22 
19
 Deposition of Irvin Bird, Vol. I, page 36; Defendant's Memorandum in Support of 
Motion for Summary Judgment R. pp. 417-473. 
20
 Deposition of Irvin Bird, Vol. I, page 54. See also, Affidavit of Irvin Bird. R. pp. 474-
486. 
21
 Deposition of Irvin Bird, Vol. I, page 82. 
22Affidavit of Irvin Bird R. pp. 474-486. 
10 
21. On or about August 22, 1986, because Larry Pinnock of Leucadia, as opposed 
to Watkins, had informed Bird that Leucadia (a company contacted by Republic) was about to 
make a firm offer for all of Won-Door's stock, and because Republic had yet to obtain a clear 
understanding from Watkins as to what it's fee would be under the March 12 Agreement with 
Won-Door, Republic had its attorney, Douglas Parry, contact Watkins to demand a fee 
agreement prior to the closing of the anticipated acquisition of Won-Door by Leucadia. Parry 
followed his telephone contact with Watkins with a letter to Watkins which confirmed Watkins' 
acknowledgment to Parry that he and his principals owed an obligation to Republic and Watkins 
agreed, among other things, to pay a fee to Republic of $1,000,000.00. Parry also asked 
attorney Watkins to immediately get back to him if there where any misunderstandings. Watkins 
never contacted Parry as requested in above referenced letter to Watkins.23 
22. Instead, upon receipt of the letter from attorney Parry, Watkins telephoned Bird 
late in the afternoon of Friday, August 22, 1986, and informed him that he, Watkins, was on 
his way to Republic's office and that a "fee agreement would be negotiated that night".24 
Watkins, without notice to Republic's counsel, Douglas Parry, negotiated, hand drafted and 
executed the "August 22 Agreement". 
23
 R. pp. 126-27. 
24
 Deposition of Irv Bird, Vol. I, page 82. See also Affidavits of Irvin Bird and Mark 
McSwain, R. pp. 474-486, 180-188. 
11 
23. At this meeting attended by Watkins, Irvin Bird and Mark McSwain, Bird 
repeatedly asked Watkins if he was in negotiations with any companies contacted by Republic, 
other than ace.25 
24. It is undisputed that Watkins stated he was "dealing with two companies, Leucadia 
and one other company which is not a company contacted by Republic and, therefore, the 
identity of that company is none of their business." Watkins refused to disclose the identity of 
the second company. 
25. Additionally, Watkins stated to Bird and McSwain at the August 22 meeting that 
he was amazed that Irv Bird, his life-long friend, did not trust him. Watkins stated that he was 
angry and disgusted that Irv Bird thought it necessary to contact Dan Berman's law firm to send 
him a demand letter, and that "Dan Berman was the type of lawyer that would hold this matter 
in litigation indefinitely and that no one would get paid."26 
26. If TSI is considered one of the "ten listed companies" as referred to in the 
Watkin's agreement with Parry, Republic would receive a fee of $1,000,000.00. If TSI was 
considered as one of the "ten listed companies" on the August 22, agreement Republic would 
be entitled to a fee of $500,000.00 as opposed to the $5,000.00 tendered by the defendants. 
25
 Deposition of Irvin Bird, Vol. I, pages 82-83; Affidavit of Mark McSwain R. pp. 180-
188. 
26
 Affidavit of Irvin Bird; Affidavit of Mark McSwain. R. pp. 474-486, R. pp. 180-188. 
12 
27. On September 30, 1986, Won-Door, together with TSI, entered into a loan 
agreement in the amount of $15,000,000 with the Bank of Louisville in contemplation of the 
pending acquisition of Won-Door by TSI. 
28. On October 20, 1986, Won-Door entered into a formal Acquisition Agreement 
with TSI which by its express terms indicates that it was negotiated at an earlier date. 
29. On October 27, 1986, TSI acquired all of the outstanding shares of Won-Door 
Corporation for a cash payment of fifteen million dollars and the exchange of one million shares 
of TSI stock valued on that day at $24.75 per share for a total purchase price paid to Won-Door 
of $39,750,000.00. 
30. On October 27, 1986, as a result of that transaction, two of the entities which 
received cash and stock valued at more than $2,369,000.00 were owned or controlled by 
Watkins or his wife. Such entities are (i) Four Oaks, Ltd., a Utah limited partnership in which 
Watkins' wife (who is also one of his law partners) is the sole general partner, and (ii) React 
Systems, Inc., a defunct Utah public corporation in which Watkins is the sole surviving 
shareholder and officer. React Systems, Inc. received $150,750.00 in cash. Four Oaks, Ltd. 
received $363,750.00 in cash plus 75,000 shares of T.S. Industries stock then valued at 
$1,856,250.00. Neither Four Oaks, Ltd. or React Systems, Inc. owned shares in Won-Door 
Corporation prior to October 27, 1986, nor, from any documents related to the transaction is 
there any evidence that these entities had any role in the merger transaction, except to receive 
payments of cash and stock. Watkins, on October 27, 1986 had outstanding Judgments and 
Federal tax liens against him exceeding $400,000.00. 
13 
31. Immediately after the acquisition of Won-Door by TSI, Watkins became the chief 
financial officer of Won-Door drawing a salary of $100,000.00 per year, and eventually became 
CEO of TSI drawing a salary of at least $121,000.00 per year. 
32. It is undisputed that on May 5, 1989 Watkins filed a "no asset" Chapter 7 
personal Bankruptcy listing claims exceeding $1,000,000.00, including Judgments and Federal 
tax liens dating from 1984 and a debt owed to Republic listed by Watkins as $275,000.00. No 
where on Watkins' sworn Bankruptcy schedules do the names Won-Door, TSI, Far/Four Oaks, 
Ltd., or React Postal Services, Inc. appear. 
33. It is undisputed that Boettcher & Co. received the sum of $256,000.00 in cash, 
an amount which is less than fifty percent of the fee to which Boettcher would otherwise be 
entitled under the express terms of the Boettcher Agreement. 
34. It is undisputed that defendants, relying upon provisions of the August 22 
Agreement have tendered the sum of $5,000.00 as full payment of Republic's claim for a finders 
fee in finding TSI as a buyer for all of Won-Door's stock. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The August 22 Agreement is void or voidable and defendants' reliance on the August 
22 Agreement fails as a matter of law because Watkins breached his contractual duty of good 
faith and fair dealing in negotiating and inducing Republic to enter into the August 22 
Agreement by (i) refusing to disclose terms of the Boettcher Agreement, (ii) failing to disclose 
that Watkins had, at the time of the August 22 Agreement, been contacted by TSI, a contact 
provided by Republic and appearing on the May 27, 1986 list of qualified companies delivered 
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to Watkins, and (iii) by failing to disclose that he had entered into negotiations with TSI for the 
purchase of all of Won-Door's stock. This fact was so material to the August 22 Agreement that 
Watkins, as a matter of law at the time he negotiated the August 22 Agreement, did not have 
any privilege of nondisclosure but had an affirmative duty to fully disclose that, in addition to 
Leucadia, he had been contacted by and had entered into negotiations with a contact (TSI) 
brought to him by Republic. 
The August 22 Agreement is so ambiguous as to the parties' understanding as to which 
companies comprised the "list of ten qualified companies" that, even considering all extrinsic 
evidence, it is impossible to conclude that there was a meeting of the minds, thus, August 22 
Agreement is voidable. There is no list attached to the August 22 Agreement. In fact, there 
is no list of ten companies in existence. There is a list of 11 contacts (May 21 list) and a list 
of 15 contacts (May 27 list). There is nothing in the August 22 Agreement that in any way ties 
it to the May 21 list. It is undisputed that Republic never agreed and in fact disputed that it 
should limit its exclusions to ten contacts as Watkins told Republic was required by the Boettcher 
Agreement. It is undisputed that after supplying Watkins with both the May 21 list and the May 
27 lists, Republic continued to contact companies at Watkins request. Watkins, as a lawyer and 
draftsman of the August 22 Agreement, could have easily referred specifically to the May 21 
list or listed the ten companies as part of the agreement. It is undisputed that Watkins did 
neither. 
As a matter of law, the fact that the shareholders of Won-Door elected to sell 100% of 
their stock for $39,750,000.00, at $49.69 per share rather than 22% of their stock for 
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$7,392,000.00 at $42.00 per share, to a contact provided by Republic under its finders 
agreement (the March 12 Agreement), does not render the March 12 Agreement invalid or 
unenforceable in that the sale of all of the stock of Won-Door is consistent with (i) the clear 
intent of the shareholders of Won-Door in entering into the contract with Republic to raise funds 
through the sale of their stock in Won-Door and (ii) with the actions of Watkins subsequent to 
the March 12 Agreement whereafter Watkins authorized, participated in, and benefitted from 
Republic's continued efforts to find a buyer for all of Won-Door's stock. 
As matter of law, the fact that the March 12 Agreement provides for a $250,000.00 fee 
to Republic for finding a buyer for 22% of shareholder's stock in Won-Door for $7,392,000.00 
and is silent as to what fee would be paid to Republic in the event the shareholders of Won-Door 
elected to sell 100% of their shares in Won-Door for $39,750,000.00, does not render the 
agreement void or unenforceable in that, as matter of practical construction, the Court, from 
plain terms of the March 12 Agreement can, by simple mathematical extrapolation, find a 
reasonable fee. This fee, based upon the terms of the March 12 Agreement, is also completely 
consistent with Watkin's own interpretation of the what would be a reasonable fee for the sale 
of 100% of Won-Door's stock as demonstrated by Watkins prior oral agreements with Irvin Bird 
and Republic's attorney Douglas Parry. 
As a matter of equity and by virtue of Watkins' actions subsequent to the March 12 
Agreement where he (i) continued to encourage, participate in and benefit from Republic's 
efforts in finding a buyer for all of Won-Doors stock, (ii) concurrently refused Republic's 
requests to enter into a written agreement to clarify a reasonable fee while he insisted that 
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Republic rely on his (Watkins') promises that Republic would be paid a reasonable fee in the 
event Republic found a buyer for 100% of the stock in Won-Door, and stated that no fee 
agreement would be necessary, and (iii) having orally agreed with Irvin Bird and Doug Parry 
that a fee of at least $1,000,000.00 was reasonable based upon the terms of the March 12 
Agreement, defendants are now estopped from claiming that Republic is not entitled to a fee 
reasonably contemplated by the March 12 Agreement. 
Plaintiff should have been awarded Partial Summary judgment in the amount of 
$1,343,550.00 representing the fee due Republic as reasonably ascertainable from the terms of 
March 12 Agreement and the oral agreements regarding a fair fee made by Watkins after the 
March 12 Agreement. 
There remain questions of fact pertaining to Plaintiffs claims as to constructive fraud and 
actual fraud. The District Court should have reserved these issues, as well as the issues of 
punitive damages, until the time of trial. 
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ARGUMENT 
UNDER THE UNDISPUTED FACTS OF THIS CASE 
WATKINS, WHO WAS ALREADY IN A CONTRACTUAL 
RELATIONSHD? WITH REPUBLIC, BREACHED HIS DUTY 
OF GOOD FAITH AND FAD* DEALING IN NEGOTIATING 
THE AUGUST 22 AGREEMENT BY BOTH FAILING TO 
DISCLOSE WHAT COMPAMES HE WAS DEALING WITH 
AND IN MISREPRESENTING THAT, OTHER THAN 
LEUCADIA, HE WAS NOT DEALING WITH ANY OF 
REPUBLIC'S CONTACTS. ACCORDINGLY THE AUGUST 
22 AGREEMENT IS VOD3 OR VOD3ABLE AS A MATTER 
OF LAW. 
In this case, the defendants based their entire defense on the fact that the August 22, 1986 
finders fee agreement was a valid, binding contract and that pursuant to the terms of that August 
22 agreement is entitled to a commission of "five thousand dollars ($5,000)" inasmuch as TSI, 
the eventual buyer of Won-Door for a total purchase price of $39,000,000.00 was not one of 
the ten qualified companies referred to in the August 22 agreement even though TSI was a 
contact brought to Won-Door through the efforts of Republic. 
Further as evidenced by the brief oral statements my by Judge Daniels at the conclusion of 
oral agreement it appears that Judge Daniels based his decision to grant Defendants' motion for 
Summary Judgment on the single finding that "based upon the other evidence it is pretty clear 
that those ten contacts, when the list of ten was supplied in April, were intended to be the ones 
that would entitle Republic to a fee".(R. p. 415). 
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Accordingly, the consideration of the validity and applicability of the August 22 
agreement is central to this appeal. 
Preliminary, it should be noted that defendants having this asserted contract as its defense 
to plaintiffs claims for a commission over and above five thousand dollars ($5,000.00), bear 
the burden of proving the validity and enforceability of this contract.27 
It has been recognized since the beginning of this century that the doctrine of caveat 
emptor is no longer uniformly applicable. A comprehensive review of the background 
concerning the changes of Court's attitudes toward the doctrine of caveat emptor is found in 
a Texas Law Review article entitled "Fraud-Concealment and Nondisclosure.28 In addition 
to discussing fraud, this article applies the principles of concealment and nondisclosure to 
contract law. As stated in that article: 
The attitude of the courts toward nondisclosure is undergoing an 
change and contrary to Lord Cairn's famous remark, it would 
seem that the object of the law in these cases should be to impose 
on parties to the transaction a duty to speak whenever justice, 
equity and fair dealing demand it.29 
This article goes on to list as one of the principal factors where under the law the courts 
have imposed the duty of disclosure in a contractual situation is where the materiality of the fact 
not disclosed is substantial: 
27
 B & R Supply v. Brinehurst . 503 P.2d 316 (1972 Utah). 
28
 "Fraud-Concealment and Nondisclosure, Texas Law Review, Vol. XV, Dec. 1936, page 
1. 
29
 Id., at page 31. 
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a proper inquiry would be whether the defect concealed by the 
vendor was a minor one or one of a serious nature. In a contract 
for excavation, was the condition of the land such to impose a 
burden out of proposition as to what it would ordinarily be? In a 
marriage contract was a matter concealed such as it would go the 
essence of the contract or as Professor Williston would say, "Does 
it go to the basis of the contract"?30 
Since this article, (1936), courts generally, including the courts in Utah, have addressed 
these questions and specifically held that when a fact is clearly material to an agreement and one 
party to the contract does not know that fact, the contracting party who is aware of the fact does 
not have a privilege of nondisclosure and must speak.31 In Elder v. Clawson the Utah Supreme 
Court observed: 
Knowledge that the other party to a contemplated 
transaction is acting under a mistaken belief as to certain facts is 
a factor in determining that a duty of disclosure is owing .There 
is much authority to the effect that if one party to a contract or 
transaction has superior knowledge, or knowledge which is not 
within the fair and reasonable reach of the other party and which 
he could not discover by the exercise of reasonable diligence or 
means of knowledge that are not open to both parties alike , he is 
under a legal obligation to speak, and his silence constitutes fraud, 
especially when the other party relies upon him to communicate 
to him the true state of fact to enable him to judge of the 
expediency of the bargain.32 
30
 Id. 
31
 Elder v. Clawson 384 P.2d 802 (1963 Utah); Union Tank Car v. Wheat, 387 P.2d 1000 
(Utah 1964); Tolboe Construction Company v. Staker Paving & Construction Company, 682 
P.2d 843 (Utah 1984). 
32
 Elder at page 805. 
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Since Elder, the Utah Supreme Courts have applied these principles beyond fraud cases 
and have found that when a fact is so material as to render a transaction unconscionable absent 
its disclosure, the contract will be rejected.33 Or, if its nondisclosure results in a unilateral 
mistake of fact on the part of one party, and the mistake if mutual would render the contract 
void, then the contract is voidable by the party being unaware of the material fact.34 
Utah has also found that a duty of "good faith" and "fair dealing" by both statute and 
common law exists between parties to a contract,35 and rejected contracts where after review 
the course of dealing between the parties found that one party did not act in good faith or dealt 
unfairly with the other party. 
In the instant case, it is was undisputed in the District Court that the plaintiff was the 
procuring cause of TSI purchase of Won-Door's stock. It was also undisputed that at the time 
that Watkins entered into negotiations with Irvin Bird and Mark McSwain on August 22, 1986, 
he had also previously entered into negotiations with TSI for the purpose of selling all of Won-
Door's stock. It is also undisputed that Irvin Bird had discussed TSI directly with Watkins and 
had listed TSI many months before on the list of companies Republic had contacted and 
submitted this list to Watkins on or about May 27, 1986. However, on August 22 during the 
negotiation leading up to the preparation of the August 22 Agreement Watkins, when asked to 
33
 Union Tank Car . Id. 
34
 Tolboe Construction, Id. at 846. 
35
 Section 70 A-l-203 U.C.A. (1953 as amended); Polvglvcoat v. Holcomb. 591 P.2d 449 
(Utah 1979); Leigh Furniture v. Isom. 637 P.2d 293 (Utah 1982). 
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disclose who he was dealing with for the purpose of selling Won Door, told Bird and McSwain 
that he was dealing with "Leucadia and one other company, which you (Republic) didn't contact 
and therefore, it is none of your business." Specifically, the following is Bird's deposition 
testimony concerning the August 22 meeting:36 
Q So on August 22nd, '86 Reed storms into your office and he writes 
out the first page of Exhibit 6? 
A Well, not that simply. I had Mr. Mark McSwain there. We had 
a couple hours of disagreement. That is when we confronted Reed about any 
other companies. We asked Reed to positively identify who the other companies 
were, that we would do nothing until we knew who they were. Reed said it was 
none of our business. And it's our position at that point we were defrauded 
because he knew-he knew that Thermal Systems, T.S. Industries, and TSI had 
been our company. 
We had a long discussion regarding this fee as it relates no only to but 
it might relate to anyone else that we had contacted, and we asked Reed to tell 
us who the companies were that were negotiating. He said they were close with 
another company besides . We wanted to know who that was, and Mark 
McSwain and I were present. This was a late night meeting; everybody had gone 
home. The meeting the next day, or the 23rd was to be held with , and the 
36
 Deposition of Irvin Bird, Vol. I, pages 81-83. 
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pressure of trying to get something down, we did not want to sign this agreement. 
Reed said. If vou don't sign this agreement you'll have no agreement 
whatsoever, [emphasis added] We said, We think you should tell us who else 
you've dealt with. We had some discussion if any of these purchasers were on 
Exhibit 4, or on Exhibit-
ed 2? 
A ~2, we intended to get paid, and Reed told us if we wanted to get 
paid at all on we'd have to sign an agreement; otherwise, there would be no 
agreement whatever. 
Q And he refused to tell you who Won-Door was dealing with? 
A Absolutely. We wanted to take more time, have it reviewed bv 
counsel. Reed sat down on his knee and wrote the thing out. We signed it 
and he left, [emphasis added] 
Q Okay. He wrote it in your presence? 
A He did, but not with—yeah. 
Q Now, did he write it after you had apparently argued about it for 
two hours? 
A Well, the argument was still going on. We still wanted to know, 
we thought it was our right to know who was buying the company besides 
Leucadia. He said it was none of our business. 
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This recitation and the more detail recitation found in the Affidavits of Irvin Bird and 
Mark McSwain of the events leading up to the August 22 meeting and the discussion held at that 
meeting have never been rebutted by Watkins. 
The entire purpose for the negotiation and execution of the contract on August 22, all of 
which were initiated by Watkins in disregard of Republic's attorney request to deal with him, 
was to reach an understanding as to what fee that Republic should receive if an entity found by 
Republic should purchase all of Won-Door's stock. 
It is Defendants' position that because TSI was not listed on the "list of ten companies", 
that under the terms of the August 22 Agreement, Republic is only entitled to a fee of $5,000 -
- Notwithstanding the fact that Republic would be entitled to a fee of $1,342,550 if a fee was 
extrapolated from the initial March 12 letter agreement; and notwithstanding the fact that 
Watkins agreed to a fee of $1,000,000 under the terms of Watkins agreement with Parry if 
Leucadia bought Won-Door; and notwithstanding the fact that Republic would be entitled to a 
fee of $500,000 under the terms of the August 22 Agreement if TSI was one of the companies 
on the list of ten companies referred to in that agreement. 
Under these circumstances, obviously the fact that Watkins had been contacted by TSI 
and had entered into serious negotiations with TSI for the purchase of all of the stock in Won-
Door were facts that went directly to heart of the negotiation concerning what fee Republic 
would be entitled to if one of it's contacts purchased all of Won-Door's stock and as a matter 
of contract law that fact that Watkins was in serious negotiation with TSI should have been 
disclosed by Watkins at the time the contract was negotiated. 
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Under prevailing principles of contract law, Watkins had no privilege of nondisclosure. 
Watkins, having failed to make the required disclosure, breached his duty of good faith and fair 
dealing with Republic, and Republic is entitled to rescind the August 22, 1986 agreement. This 
breach of good faith and fair dealing is particularly aggravated by the fact that it was Watkins, 
an attorney, who chose to go around Republics attorney and contact the principles of Republic 
directly and after hours insisting that an agreement must be reached that night. 
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THE AUGUST 22, 1986 CONTRACT IS VOID IN THAT 
THERE WAS NO MEETING OF THE MINDS AS TO WHAT 
WAS MEANT BY "ten listed qualified companies". 
As stated, the intended purpose of the August 22 Agreement was to reach some 
understanding as to the fee due Republic would receive in the event that all of Won-Door stock 
is sold to one of its contacts. The fee agreement sets forth a fee schedule and specifically states 
that the fee schedule is applicable if Won-Door sells all of its stock to either Leucadia or James 
Volker. As almost an afterthought, there is a clause in the contract saying that the contract also 
applies to "any of the other qualified ten companies." At the bottom of the contract it states, 
"Republic Group also entitled to $5,000.00 if Won-Door sold, but none of the above* become 
purchasers of Won-Door." Then the asterisk in the agreement provides, "*i.e., , or ten listed 
qualified companies or James Volker." 
Defendants argued in the District Court that the reason for the ten listed companies was 
to comply with paragraph six of the Boettcher agreement, entered into at a time subsequent with 
Watkin's agreement with Republic on March 12 and subsequent to the time Republic contacted 
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TSI, whereby Won-Door was required to provide ten exceptions for which Boettcher would not 
be entitled to a fee. 
Defendants go on to contend that the May 21 letter from Republic to Watkins listing 
eleven companies is the list referred to in the August 22 Agreement. 
However, it is undisputed that there is, in fact, no list of ten companies. Secondly, it 
is also undisputed that no where on the face of either the August 22 Agreement or the May 21 
letter is there anything tying these two documents together. Nor is there anything in Parry's 
letter to Watkins tying the phrase "list of ten companies" to the May 21 list. Nor, contrary to 
Defendant's suggestion to the District Court, was the May 21, 1988 letter or any other list of 
ten companies ever attached and or in any other way incorporated as part of the August 22, 
contract. 
In this regard it certainly would have been a simple matter for Watkins, an attorney, and 
the drafter of the August 22 Agreement, to simply refer specifically to the May 21 letter and 
attach the May 21 letter or to avoid any confusion, to simply write down the ten listed qualified 
companies as part of the agreement. 
Plaintiff suggests that Watkins' decision not to involve attorney Parry in the August 22 
meeting coupled with his failure to take the obvious course of either specifically referring to the 
May 21 list, or list the ten companies in his writing, is clear evidence of his bad faith and 
possible fraudulent intent on August 22, 1986. In any event, by these actions, Watkins should 
be charged with responsibility for the patent ambiguity in the August 22 Agreement. 
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Further in this regard, it is also undisputed that in addition to the May 21 letter listing 
eleven companies, Bird submitted an additional list of fifteen companies on May 27, 1986 all 
long before the negotiation of the August 22 agreement and pursuant to a requirement of the 
March 12 letter agreement. 
It is also undisputed that under the Boettcher agreement, all ten exclusions to that contract 
needed to be submitted to Boettcher not later than May 7, 1986, several weeks before either lists 
were prepared by Republic. It is also undisputed that no list of exclusions was ever submitted 
to Boettcher. It is also undisputed that from late May until August 22, there were continuing 
discussions and disagreements by Republic that they should not be required to reduce any of 
their lists to ten companies to comply with Watkin's subsequent agreement with Boettcher. 
Republic also at the time the May 21 list was submitted or shortly thereafter expressly told 
Watkins that the May 21 list was not intended as the list of ten companies as required by the 
undisclosed terms of the Boettcher Agreement. Finally it is undisputed that Watkins on frequent 
and regular basis after the May 21 1986 list and continuing up to August 22, 1986 encouraged 
Republic to continue it's efforts in finding additional companies to purchase all of Won-Doors 
stock notwithstanding the Boettcher Agreement. 
The law in Utah has long recognized if the terms of a contract are so ambiguous to make 
it impossible, even after considering extrinsic evidence, to say there was a meeting of the minds, 
the contract unenforceable and void.37 
37
 Pingree, Id. 
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In summary, Republic submits that under the above circumstance that there was not a 
meeting of the minds as to what was meant by the phrase "the listed ten qualified companies" 
as found in the August 22 agreement due to the fact that Watkins affirmative misrepresention 
that he was in serious negotiation "with only two companies emit and one other which is not 
one of yours" . Republic submits, that under the circumstances, it is patently obvious that if it 
had of known that the two companies Watkins with which had been dealing were emit and TSI, 
both of which were Republic's contacts that it would not have agreed to the August 22 
agreement unless TSI was clearly listed as one of the ten qualified contacts entitling Republic 
to a fee of some $500,000. 
In the case of C & J Realty. Inc. vs. Willev38. the Utah Supreme Court specifically 
stated: 
A contract is considered ambiguous if words used to express 
meaning and intention of the parties are insufficient in the sense 
that the contract may be understood to reach two or more 
plausible meanings.39 
The courts also recognize when documents are incorporated into a contract by 
reference, the reference must be clear and unequivocal.40 
Applying these principles to these undisputed facts, plaintiff respectfully submits that 
the reference, in the August 22, 1986 agreement to " ten listed qualified companies," is 
C & J Realty. Inc. vs. Willev. 758 P.2d 923 (Utah 1988). 
Id. at pg. 6. 
United California Bank vs. Prudential Insurance Co.. 681 P.2d 390 (Ariz. 1983). 
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obviously so ambiguous as to what the parties understood to comprise the ten qualified 
companies, that this Court cannot find a meeting of the minds as to which ten companies 
contacted by Republic are meant by this phrase.41. This is particularly so considering that it 
was the defendants in this case, not the plaintiff, who bore the burden of proving the validity 
of the /August 22 contract. 
The District Court's implied finding that the facts, even if viewed in light most favorable 
to the plaintiff, raise no material issue as to the as validity and enforceability of the August 22nd 
agreement must be rejected. 
41
 As a matter of law, the ambiguity of a contract is a question of law. Crowther vs. 
Carter. 767 P.2d 129 (Ut.App. 1989). 
29 
Ill 
UNDER THE UNDISPUTED FACTS AS WERE BEFORE 
THE DISTRICT COURT PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLED TO 
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON IT'S 
CONTRACTUAL CLAIMS AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
A. 
The letter agreement between Watkins and the Plaintiff dated March 12, 
1986 is a valid and binding finder's agreement or contract Between the 
Plaintiff and the Defendants and was a binding agreement at the time TSI 
purchased all of the stock of Won-Door, 
Defendants, in their various memoranda in support of their Motion for Summary 
Judgment submitted to the District Court have conceded, that Watkins was the express agent of 
defendants Won-Door, Jay A. Smart, Ron Smart and the stockholders of Won-Door. 
The agency relationship and the broad extent thereof is established by the Agency Letter 
entitled "To Whom It May Concern" dated March 13, 1986, executed by Jay A. Smart on behalf 
of Won-Door Corporation and its shareholders. 
As evidenced by this agreement, the scope of Watkins agency is essentially unlimited as 
to the obtaining of funding for Won-Door or its shareholders. There is no restriction in this 
document limiting Watkins' authority to the sale of only a portion of the stock of Won-Door. 
As stated in the letter, the March 12 letter from Watkins to Plaintiff memorializing the 
agreement between Watkins and Republic, that Republic will receive a commission of $250,000 
for the placement of twenty-two percent (22%) of the outstanding stock of Won-Door, purchased 
by one of Republic's contacts for the sum of $7,392,000.00. Defendants argue that due to the 
fact that the shareholder of Won-Door eventually determined to sell one hundred percent (100%) 
30 
of their stock for the sum of $39,750,000.00 to TSI, a company contacted by Republic, such 
contract is rendered "obsolete" and therefore void and unenforceable. Further, defendants 
argue that because the principals of the plaintiff entered into discussions with Watkins attempting 
to reach a written fee agreement clarifying Republic's fee in the event one of the companies 
contacted by Republic purchased all of Won-Door's stock, that Republic has somehow 
demonstrated or recognized that the March 12 Agreement is not binding and that such 
negotiations amount to a further recognition by Republic that it is not entitled to a fee because 
100%, as opposed to 22%, of the stock of Won-Door was sold to one of Republic's contacts. 
Plaintiff submits that as a matter of common sense and long established principles of 
basic contract law defendants' arguments are unsustainable. The clear basic underlying intent 
of the parties as evidenced by the March 12 Agreement between Republic and Won-Door was 
to pay Republic a commission for raising funding for Won-Door by a sale of their stock. 
Accordingly, given this purpose, the issue is whether Republic's rights under the March 12 
Agreement should be rendered void and unenforceable by the simple fact that Won-Door decided 
to accept an offer for the sale of 100% of its stock by a contact brought to them by Republic. 
Utah Courts have held, as a matter of contract law, that the courts may imply or impose 
terms to a contract which are either reasonably implied in law or in fact in enforcing the intent 
the contract.42 
In the instant case, the question is what are the rights of the parties under the March 
12 Agreement if Won-Door should sell more than 22% of its stock to a contact procured by of 
42
 Allstate Enterprises v. Hertford. 772 P.2d 466 (Utah Ct App 1989). 
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Republic. In this case the contract is silent as to the rights of the parties if Won-Door's 
shareholder decide to sell more than 22% of their stock to a Republic contact. 
Plaintiff submits that a matter of practical construction this court can clearly ascertain the 
intent of the contracting parties from the express provisions of the contract and from the 
subsequent actions of the Defendant in furthering this express intent and impose terms to the 
March 12 Agreement which are reasonably implied in both fact and law. 
It is undisputed that the underlying intent of the March 12 Agreement is to pay Republic 
a fee for raising funds for Won-Door or its shareholders through its efforts in finding a buyer 
for the stock of Won-Door. The fee to be paid to Republic, under the March 12 Agreement, 
is a function of the amount of stock sold and the price received for that stock. 
It is also undisputed that shortly after the March 12 Agreement, the principals of 
Republic informed Watkins that there was little interest in purchasing a minority position in a 
family held corporation. The principals of Republic specifically asked Watkins' approval to 
contact other companies with a view towards purchasing all of Won-Door's outstanding stock. 
Watkins did not only agree that Republic should contact other companies with a view towards 
purchasing all of Won-Door's outstanding stock, but in fact, encouraged it. This is clearly 
evidenced by the fact that commencing in April, 1986, and continuing into early May, 1986, 
Watkins, together with principals of Republic, met with Drexel Burnham & Lambert (at Won-
Door's offices on May 7, 1986) and (at's offices in April, 1986) for the purpose of negotiating 
a sale of 100% of Won-Door's stock. Additionally at this time, Republic discussed at least 
twenty to thirty different companies with Watkins, all of which were interested in purchasing 
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not less than 100% of Won-Door's stock, which companies included TSI Industries. At no time 
did Watkins revoke the March 12 Agreement or express any opinion that the March 12 
Agreement was not operative. In fact, Watkins promised Republic that it would be paid a fee 
and cited to Irvin Bird their long standing friendship as the reason Watkins should be trusted to 
see that plaintiff received its anticipated fee. 
The fact that the plaintiff attempted to clarify, by means of written agreement specifically 
spelling out precisely what fee would be paid to Republic for the sale of 100% of Won-Door's 
stock, and continued to press Watkins for a written clarification setting forth what Watkins 
specifically meant by his promises that Republic would be paid a "fair" fee coupled with 
assurances such as "don't worry Irvin D., I'll take care of you" certainly does not constitute an 
acknowledgement by Republic that it did not have a fee coming to them under the March 12 
Agreement if one of Republic's contact bought all of Won-Door's stock. 
At his deposition Irvin Bird clearly testified that the basis of this disagreement with 
Watkins was not whether Republic were entitled to a fee under the March 12 Agreement, but 
was based upon a desire to reach a clear understanding as to what Republic's fee should be in 
the event one of Republic's contacts purchased 100% of Won-Door's stock. 
Question (Faber): But up to at least May 21st, 1986, the only 
fee agreement that you had would have been embodied in the 
March 12th letter, right? 
33 
Answer (Bird): Not really, We had verbal agreements. The fact 
that we were working together, we had — it might be the only one 
in writing but we had verbal ones all along. We work on a daily 
basis. Hell almighty, you didn't think we were working for free 
did you."43 
In the District Court Defendants relied on the case of Bunnel v. Bills44 as supporting 
their argument that the March 12 Agreement must specifically provide for the sale of 100% of 
Won-Doors stock and the fee for such a sale must be specifically stated if the March 12 is to 
be enforceable is not well taken. The court in Bunnel rejected the defendant's argument that an 
earnest money agreement was void because it was indefinite as to what personal property and 
fixtures would be transferred in the sale of an Alta restaurant, and held as follows: 
There is substantial evidence to support the trial court that the 
defendant Stevens had a manifest intention to be bound by the 
terms that were offered by Bunnel and if so, in light of the 
circumstances under which the agreement was entered can the 
intention of the parties be ascertained with reasonable certainty. 
Stevens' claims that realty represented by Smith was acting as 
Bunnel's agent for the purpose of procuring a sale of the Alta 
Lodge. For this reason, the instrument in question was drafted by 
Schmidt as her agent, and must be construed most strongly against 
her. . . . In any event, the intentions of the parties obtained with 
reasonable certainty must be given effect and the rule of 
construction, [strict construction] presented by Stevens will not be 
applied.45 
43
 Deposition of Irvin Bird, Vol. I, page 51. 
44
 Bunnel v. Bills. 368 P.2d 596 (Utah 1962). 
45
 Id. at p. 600. 
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As stated, the intentions of the parties in this case, as evidenced by the Agency Letter 
and the March 12 Agreement, is clearly to raise funding for Won-Door. Initially, Won-Door 
wanted to sell only 22% of its stock, however, when that became difficult, Watkins specifically 
authorized plaintiff to proceed to contact companies to purchase 100% of the corporation's stock 
and for this purpose met personally with the principals of Republic together with contacts 
presented by Republic (including evens and Drexel Burnham & Lambert) and eventually, but 
without disclosure of any kind to Republic, concluded the sale of 100% of Won-Door's stock 
to TSI, an entity previously brought into the transaction by Republic. Further, Watkins 
repeatedly assured Republic that it would receive a fee for its services. Under these 
circumstances, and by the acts of Won-Door's agent Watkins, defendants have clearly manifested 
their interpretation of the March 12 Agreement in a manner entirely consistent with the intent 
of the parties as can be derived from the "four corners" of the March 12, agreement. 
B. 
Defendants, by the conduct of their own agent, Reed Watkins, 
are estopped to deny, (i) the validity of the March 12 
Agreement, and (ii) that a fee based upon a reasonable 
application of the March 12, Agreement is due Republic. 
The basic equitable principle of contract by estoppel is set forth in the case of Sugarhouse 
v. Anderson46, a 1980 Utah case cited by the defendants in their Memorandum in Support of 
Motion for Summary Judgment. The Sugarhouse court specifically states: 
46
 Sugarhouse v. Anderson. 610 P.2d 1369 (Utah 1980). 
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We note that this jurisdiction recognizes the doctrine of promissory 
estoppel whereby an individual who has made a promise which an 
individual should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance 
on the part of the promisee or third person, and which does induce 
such action or forbearance is estoppel [sic] to deny or repudiate the 
promise should the promisee or third party suffer detriment 
thereby47. 
In accordance with this clear statement of basic contract law, the defendants should be 
estopped from the repudiating the enforceability of the March 12 Agreement. As stated above, 
Watkins from March through August 22, 1986, instructed the plaintiff to find contacts who 
might be interested in acquiring all of the stock of Won-Door. When asked to clarify in writing 
what fee the plaintiff would receive in the event all of the stock of Won-Door was purchased by 
one of Republic's contact, Watkins refused to enter into a written agreement and deflected the 
demand for such an agreement by relying upon his friendship and past relationship with Bird and 
assuring the plaintiff that it would be paid a fee and that he should be trusted and that either a 
fee agreement was unnecessary or that he (Watkins) would eventually work out a written 
understanding regarding Republic's fee arrangement. Relying upon Watkins' promises, the 
plaintiff spent substantial time and effort finding many companies qualified to acquire all the 
stock of Won-Door. 
One of these companies found by Republic was TSI, which acquired 100% of the 
outstanding shares of Won-Door for the sum of $39,750,000.00. Under these circumstances and 
consistent with Sugarhouse, supra, defendants are clearly estopped from denying that the March 
12 Agreement constitutes a binding contract requiring Won-Door to pay a fee to Republic, or 
47
 A/., at p. 1373. 
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that the subsequent oral promises by Watkins constitute a binding agreement, standing alone, to 
pay Republic a fee consistent with and reasonably implied by the terms of the March 12 
Agreement. 
Not only are defendants estopped by their actions subsequent to March 13, 1986 to assert 
that Republic is not entitled to a fee under the March 12 Agreement, but they are estopped to 
assert that because the amount of such fee is not specifically spelled out by such contract, that 
the contract is unenforceable. 
As stated, it is undisputed that Republic primarily through its President, Irvin Bird, 
repeatedly "hammered" on Watkins to negotiate an agreement clarifying what fee Republic 
would be paid in the event Won-Door sold all of its stock to one of Republic's contacts. 
Obviously the reason for entering into these negotiations was that both parties recognized that 
a fee of two hundred and fifty thousand dollars for a sale of only twenty-two percent (22%) was 
not reasonable for a sale of one hundred percent (100%) of the outstanding stock of Won-Door. 
Watkins did not tell Republic that a fee was not negotiable, but only refused to settle the 
issue by an agreement reducing the fee to writing. 
In this regard, it is, however, undisputed that Watkins did in fact enter into oral 
agreements for the payment of an appropriate fee in particular circumstances. On May 7, 1986, 
when Drexel Burnham met with Watkins, the Smarts and a principal of Republic, Irvin Bird, 
told Watkins that Drexel would require a fee of ten percent (10%) of the purchase price to sell 
all of Won-Door's stock. Bird told Watkins that Republic would split that fee with Drexel (5% 
each). Watkins stated that this fee arrangement would be acceptable. However, such oral 
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agreement was not taken further because Watkins never entered into any relationship with 
Drexel. 
Additionally, there were discussions between Watkins and Bird that an extrapolation of 
a fee based upon the ratio between twenty-two percent and one hundred percent would be 
reasonable. That is, Republic's fee would be approximately one million dollars. 
Probably the most telling evidence of Watkins' interpretation of the obligation imposed 
upon the shareholders of Won-Door if they sold all of their stock to a buyer found by Republic 
is found in Watkins' agreement with Douglas Parry, as confirmed in the August 20, 1986 letter 
from Parry to Watkins. This letter confirms that Watkins agreed with Parry to pay a fee of 
$1,000,000.00 based upon a ratio of $250,000.00 for every 22% stock sold by Won-Door's 
shareholder to one of Republics contacts. 
Watkins, having entered into these oral fee agreements with the plaintiff and Parry, is 
estopped from now asserting that the March 12 Agreement is void because it contains an 
ambiguity as to what fee Republic would receive if all of the stock of Won-Door was sold. 
Further, for the same reason above stated, defendants are also estopped to deny that the 
reasonable intentions of the parties as to an appropriate fee cannot now be ascertained from the 
March 12 Agreement. 
In light of the foregoing, the Court can clearly ascertain the intent of the parties and 
impose a fee obligation as clearly implied from both the terms of the March 12 Agreement and 
the actual intent as evidenced from Watkins' discussions with Irv Bird regarding a contemplated 
50/50 split of Drexel's 10% fee with Republic and what amounts to a clear agreement with 
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Republic's attorney Douglas Parry of a fee of $1,000,000.00 based upon the terms of the March 
12 Agreement. 
An application of these facts demonstrates that a term reasonably drawn from the March 
12 Agreement is that Republic is entitled to a fee representing 3.38% of the sales price of the 
amount received by Won-Door for the sale of their stock. Obviously, Won-Door agreed to pay 
to Republic the sum of $250,000.00 if Republic raised $7,392,000.00. The resulting fee as a 
percentage of the money raised through the sale of Won-Door's stock is derived from a fraction, 
the numerator of which is $250,000.00 (agreed fee) and the denominator of which is 
$7,392,000.00 (money raised). The resulting percentage is 3.38%. 
Applying the commission percentage of 3.38% based upon the relationship of $250,000 
for every 7,392,000 paid for Won-Door's stock, Republic's fee would be 3.38% of 
$39,750,000.00, or $1,343,550.00. Not only is this fee a precise mathematical extrapolation 
of the terms found in the March 12 Agreement but is entirely consistent with the approach 
Watkins used in reaching an "agreement" with Doug Parry. 
It is a basic principle of contract law that when a contract is silent as to what fee will be 
paid, the court can as matter of practical construction substitute a reasonable fee.48 Further, 
it is a basic principle of contract law that if the intentions of the parties can be reasonably 
determined from within the four corners of the contract, their intentions will be given full 
effect.49 Plaintiff submits that the parties' intentions as to what fee should be paid for the 
48
 Contracts. Am.Jur.2d Sections 242-255. 
49
 Id. 
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money raised on behalf of Won-Door by Republic can be reasonably determined from the face 
of the March 12 Agreement. It is clear that the parties intended that Republic's commission 
would be a function of the dollars raised from the sale of Won-Door's stock. In terms of 
percentages, that intent translates into a commission of 3.38% of every dollar raised by 
Republic. 
Finally, defendants' arguments to the District Court that the case of Pingree vs. 
Continental50 renders the March 12 Agreement unenforceable because this Court cannot, under 
Pingree51. substitute its judgment as to what constitutes a reasonable fee misstates the holding 
of the court in Pingree52. 
In Pingree53 the court was dealing with an option to renew which, on its face, was an 
agreement by the parties to agree upon a reasonable rental value in the future. The option stated 
that the reasonable rent should not exceed $800 and required that the parties agree upon a 
reasonable rental by taking a variety of specifically listed factors or circumstances into 
consideration. In rejecting the trial court's determination that a reasonable fee was $800, the 
Supreme Court found that factors or circumstances that were listed in the contract upon which 
the parties were required to base their agreement were extremely vague and in fact lead to such 
completely opposite results as to what was a reasonable fee, that the trial judge had no basis in 
50
 Pingree vs. Continental. 558 P.2d 1317 (Utah 1976). 
51
 Id. 
52
 Id. 
53
 Id. 
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the option contract for finding what a reasonable rental would be under the circumstances. The 
facts in Pingree54 are clearly distinguishable from the facts in the instant case and, in fact, the 
holding in Pingree55 completely supports Plaintiffs position that the trial court can find and 
impose a reasonable fee if the contract and the extrinsic facts demonstrate that it is reasonable. 
In this case reasonable fee can easily be derived from the March 12 Agreement by an application 
of simple mathematics. 
C. 
The Plaintiff was in fact the procuring cause of the sale of the shareholder's 
stock in Won-Door to TSI and Plaintiff is entitled to a commission as 
reasonably contemplated under the terms of the March 12 Agreement 
between Plaintiff and Defendants. 
In dealing with finder's fee agreements, courts have long applied what is commonly 
known as the "procuring cause" rule. The procuring cause rule states that when a party is 
employed to procure a purchaser, and does procure a purchaser to whom a sale is eventually 
made, he is entitled to the agreed upon commission regardless of who makes the final sale if the 
party seeking to compel payment of the commission is a procuring cause of the sale.56 
In the instant case, it is undisputed that the plaintiff, Republic, was the procuring cause 
of TSI and that TSI eventually purchased all of the shares of Won-Door. It is undisputed that 
in March, 1986, Watkins authorized Republic to search for qualified companies who were 
54
 Id. 
55
 Id. 
56
 Willis vs. Chamnlin Cable Corporation. 740 P.2d 621 (Wash. 1988). 
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interested in acquiring all of the stock of Won-Door. Irvin Bird, who was the President of 
Republic, was also, at that time, President of a company known as Western Sun. Western Sun 
was in the insulation business. It was engaged in the same business as TSI. Both Western Sun 
and TSI were outgrowths of a predecessor company known as Panelera. As a result of Bird's 
experience with TSI, he was aware that TSI was a logical candidate for the purchase of Won-
Door in that Won-Door was engaged in the building materials business specializing in core 
insulated doors. Bird was aware that TSI had recently been interested on the "acquisition trail" 
and had been acquiring a variety of companies in the building materials business. Further, both 
TSI's and Won-Door's major manufacturing plants were located in Salt Lake City, Utah. 
Further, Mr. Bird was aware that TSI needed a company with substantial earnings like Won-
Door. 
Therefore, Bird asked his associate, Bryant Cragun, to make contact with TSI. In a 
subsequent meeting with Watkins, whereat TSI was discussed as a possible purchaser of Won-
Door's stock, Mr. Bird admittedly informed Reed Watkins that although TSI was a logical 
candidate to purchase Won-Door, Watkins should be cautious and it was Bird's recommendation 
that a merger with TSI should not be concluded in that TSI was looking primarily for a company 
to increase the value of insider stock as opposed to other legitimate business purposes - as Bird 
put it "a box job." 
Defendant's suggestion that Republic should not be entitled to a fee as a result of the TSI 
acquisition of Won-Door because Bird warned and discouraged Watkins from doing business 
with TSI is not completely beside the issue. There is no dispute that Republic was the fmder 
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0fT5 . . 
notice to Republic, agreed t - - >f their stock to TSI. 
Furthn IlicM" 1111.1• in i .11, IL-IIIIIMII "i niguLiiitiiil iiiiii llliiis i q » ; i n l millers a s h a r p c o n t r a s t 
between Republics perceptioii of its duties to Watkins and Won-Doors shareholders and Watkins 
perceptioii of his duties of disclosure to Republic. Certainly, it could have been in Republics 
interest in obtaining i* •• Hent and not infi icerning TSI. 
However, since Bird was rami liar with some of TSI's problems, he did not hesitate in disclosing 
I he in I" VV" i llllhii IIIIII liinl « n iintiii),1 In VV ilkiir wc i i ' ihno'l piophrtu in llial Jilta IIIIIIK V urn 11 MI HI 
acquisition, Henry Lorin and other TSI insiders where convicted or plead guilty to securities 
fraud in connection with the manipulation of I SI stock, I 'artially as result of these activities TSI 
was forced in to Bankruptcy in February of 1989. A detailed account of the concerns Bird 
expressed to Watkins is found in a article appearing the March 16, 1987 issue of Barrons entitled 
Henry Lorin as they relate to TSI including the acquisition of Won-Door. 
Nrverllieless, Mi Hiinlll HI d in viiif." oul his agreement lo hrmgcompiimcs In "V\ on III) i » i » 
had asked Bryant Cragun, an associate of Republic to deliver the Won-Door package to TSI. 
Acting on Bii ci s instruction, Cragun in March of 1986, contacts. *nsen. a stock 
broker in Salt Lake City, and known to Cragun to ha\ e business dealiii5o wmi xienry Lorin, 
a member of the board of directors of TSI. Cragun asked Jensen to contact I x>rin and tell him 
about ill IK" p i 111 HI lii'vl'il 1 S< ilr of \A 'on Dooi "' 
57
 Affidavit of Bryant Cragun. 
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Approximately two days after this conversation, Jensen called Cragun back and reported 
that he talked to Lorin and not only was TSI interested in purchasing Won-Door, but was 
anxious to receive information about Won-Door. 
At that time, Cragun and a Mr. Don Wood went to Jensen's office in Salt Lake City, 
Utah and delivered to him the financial package concerning Won-Door, which information was 
prepared by Republic. Jensen stated he would immediately forward the information to Lorin.58 
In a subsequent meeting with Watkins and Bird, Cragun informed Watkins that they had 
delivered Won-Door's package to Henry Lorin at TSI. Aside from Bird's conversation with 
Watkins, warning him about TSI, TSI was not again mentioned in the discussions between 
Watkins and the principals of Republic until Won-Door had concluded its merger with TSI. 
This fact did not strike Republic as unusual since Bird had in good faith advised and warned 
Watkins against doing business with TSI.59 
Under these facts, it cannot be disputed that Republic was, in fact, the "procuring cause" 
of the acquisition of all of Won-Door's stock by TSI. In this regard it should be noted that 
nowhere in its Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment do the defendants 
take the position that Republic was not, in fact, the "procuring cause" of the merger between 
TSI and Republic. 
As set forth above, based upon the undisputed facts, the March Agreement entitles 
Republic to a finder's fee upon the completion of the sale of Won-Door's stock to TSI. Further, 
58
 Id. 
59
 Id., See also Affidavit of Irvin Bird. 
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Won-Door is estopped from denying the enforceabihi* . -J Mai, \ereemem u> .s 
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12 Agreement. 
k factually similar case • • • * Poggi vs. Tool Research and Engineering ,( I : 
Poggi61, the defendant Tool Research -vred into a sales agreement with the plaintiff Poggi 
for the sale of "gas deflector doors ^ .inn? the State of Washington. 
!l
"ii s [Uilll I P IHVPII l ill1 l i i i ln i ( ( i i s l i ! | | i l i p r e e m n i l hi1 ,M i In hi1 rnlitli (II In 11 niiniiissinii II.IM il 
upon his sales. Such distributorship and commission agreement was terminable upon thirty days 
notice by either party. 
Poggi eventually procured Boeing Aircraft for Fool Research as a customei Boeing 
4 ircraft entered an initial order for six hundred pieces. 
Attb- " I c: ol agreed that the order from, Boeing was 
amount of gas deflector shields than anticipated at the time they entered into the conti ,;tt:l 
commission due to anticipated increase in volume. These negotiations, proceeded, contrary to 
the instant case., in good faith Before the conclusion of the agreement for the new commission 
structure, Boeing indicated that they were going to begin negotiating with Tool for an additional 
nine hundred pieces. Before the additional nine hundred pieces were concluded, defendant Tool 
"
l
"
1
" Poggi vs. Tool Research and bngineenng 'IMl I"1 ,M *% (Wiisli l%9) 
111,
 hi 
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broke off negotiations for the revised commission structure and under the contract terminated 
Poggi's distributorship. After the effective date of Poggi's termination, Boeing placed the order 
for the nine hundred pieces. Defendant Tool Research citing the termination of the 
distributorship, refused to pay the commission due Poggi on the contract for the additional 
orders concluded after the effective date of Poggi's termination. In rejecting the defendants' 
position, the Court held: 
Although [Tools Research] had a right under the sales 
representative agreement to effectively termination the agency on 
notice, the termination could not rightfully operate to cut off the 
agent's rights to commissions already earned. As a procuring, 
efficient cause of the two orders, the agent here earned his 
commission under the contract which accorded him a commission 
on all remittances received for all formal orders. Nothing in the 
contract excluded or cut off his rights to commission on orders 
procured by him but paid after termination. Plaintiff performed 
the work, produced the desired results and earned his pay.62 
Further, the Court in Poggi went on to reject the discount of Poggi's commission 
imposed by the trial court, based upon the reasoning that subsequent negotiations did not entitle 
a court to impose its own judgment as to what would be a fair commission and thereby reduce 
the commission based upon subsequent negotiations, in a manner inconsistent with the terms of 
the parties prior written fee agreement. The Poggi court found that notwithstanding the 
termination of the contract, plaintiff had proved that he was a procuring and efficient cause of 
subsequent order from Boeing and should be paid commission based upon the terms of the 
written fee agreement. Applying the reasoning of Poggi to this case, the mere fact that plaintiff 
62
 Poggi, at page 302. 
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continued to negotiate with Watkins in .in ditntupf in n ,11 Ii „i i In JI imdcisliiiidinj1 ,is i< .vlluiil lie 
would be paid to Republic in the event ol a sale ol 100% ol Won-Door's stock to one ol the 
umip;inu\s wmlai'lnl by Krpnhlii ih 1 illlllliiiiil VVjitLiiis iilli inplril In liiiiil Ntpnhln >. (t;< In ""(in 
companies" bj vii ttie of the Boettcher Agreement; - k'k new ir. *i* - * ••• plaintiff's 
entitlement to its commission as is reasonably asce*-* ' • - «. March 12 Agreement. 
IV 
T H E R E ARE I S S U E S Q F M A T E R I A L F A C T A S T O 
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM THAT WATKINS' STOOD IN A 
CONFIDENTIAL RELATION WITH THE PLAINTIFF OR 
THAT WATKINS COMMITTED ACTUAL FRAUD IN HIS 
DEALINGS WITH THE PLAINTIFF. 
Plaintiff has also claimed in this matter HrM WuiMnw w'>« HI mlident' i! ivl.iiion1 ihip 
or relationship of trust with Republic. Plaintiff has presented substantial evidence that Watkins', 
liy "villiii" i)»l Ins p.isl lni'iJii-i".1, il(iii,iiin!"v L'lienl and sin nl icLilionshii 
relationship of confidence with Republic and in fact relied and used this relationship in dealing 
Further, Plaintiff has set forth substantial facts, which, particularly when viewed in a 
light most favorable to the plaintiff, that demonstrates that Watkins conduct towards Republic 
was part of a fraudulent course of dealings designed Incmkii lumsrlt i\\ flic r\|viiM mil V\ \\\\\\\w 
and Watkins' past creditors 
Howe i 
evidence, and that courts may consider these fact, when taken in a light most favorable to the 
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Defendants, to present genuine issues of material fact as to this claim and accordingly Plaintiff 
did not move for Summary Judgment on these issues. 
However, by the same token Defendants were not entitled to Summary Judgement in 
their favor on Plaintiff's claims of constructive fraud, actual fraud and punitive damages. 
Regardless of whether Watkins' actions in dealing with Republic were motivated by 
fraudulent intent or merely by a misunderstanding of his duties toward Republic, the existing 
contractual relationship required of him a duty of "good faith" and "fair dealing." Therefore, 
Watkins clearly had a duty to disclose his dealings with TSI to Republic and Plaintiff was 
entitled to Partial Summary Judgment against Defendants in the amount of $1,342,550.00 
pursuant to the terms of the March 12 Agreement with the Defendants and clearly Summary 
Judgment in favor of the Defendants terminating the action in Defendants' favor was in error. 
CONCLUSION 
The undisputed facts as established in the Record of this case demonstrates the unfairness 
of Watkins' dealings with Republic. A detailed review of these facts as established by the 
Record in this case together with correct application of principles of contract law compel the 
conclusion that, if not entitled to Partial Summary Judgment in the amount of $1,343,550.00 
against Defendants on Plaintiff's contract claims, and that Plaintiff was certainly entitled to the 
opportunity to complete it's discovery and submit it's claims to a jury and that the granting of 
Summary Judgment by the District Court in favor of the Defendants was in error. 
DATED the ^~D day o ^ 2 a S ^ 1 9 9 2 f . 3 
Richard/fC. 0-andall, Esq. 
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y & OFFICES OF 
RKDA.WATKIKS WATKINS 8 FABER 
W A U E R P. F A B E R . I R . 2102 EAST 3300 SOUTI I 
JEANETO DOUCLAS WATWNS 
DWID LHoDcsoK S A U LAKE C I T Y , UTAH 84H >" > 
BRIAN W.BURNETT PHONE BOI 486-5634 
March 12, 1986 
., Jr. 
The Republi: Group 
185 South Main Street 
Suite 1050 
Salt Late Ctiy, Utah 84111 
Dear Irv: 
This letter" will confirm o n understanding' of a fee arrangement 
should The Republic Group through its contacts fund, a private place-
ment of Won-Door Corporation stock.. 
The anount of 'the funding is $7f392,000 f . 176,000 shares of the 
'Won-Door stock. This is computed, at $4,2, On :> share. .Members of the 
Start family are the sellers. 
Won-Door will have 800,000 shares outstanding (all comon and 
of one class) after completion of the funding. The 176,000 shares 
represents twenty-two (22%) percent thereof. Won-Door is adjusting 
its executive bonus plan which will result in increased corporate 
earnings over the amount set forth in the Selected Pro ftorma Financial 
Infonretion. Wbn-Door anticipates is June 30, 1986 after-tax earnings 
to be not less than $2,688,000. 
It is Wbn-Door1 s intent to' becane a public cnpany within a fi u e 
year period,,. 
Upon completion and execution of such funding arrangement with The 
Republic Group's contact (s), a conmission of $250,000 will be paid to 
The Republic Group. The Republic Group will bear its own costs. Tb 
avoid misunderstanding regarding contacts, names should be submitted 
and their status qualified in advance. 
Trii] y Yours, 
Reed" A. Watkins 
F W lit 
0." 
Boettcher & Company 
aa^ mteenttistrwt Apri l 28 , 1986 
P.O. Box 54 XT * 
Denver, Colorado 60201-0054 
(303)6284000 
Mr. Jay Smart 
Chairman 
Won-Door Corporation 
1865 South 3480 West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84104 
Dear Jay: 
The purpose of this letter is to confirm in writing the 
understanding between Boettcher & Company, Inc. ("Boettcher") and 
Won-Door Corporation ("the Company") whereby Boettcher will act 
as exclusive representative for the Company to arrange and to 
negotiate, on such terms as may be acceptable to the Board of 
Directors of the Company, and subject to the approval of the 
Stockholders of the Company, if necessary or appropriate, a 
possible transaction with an appropriate third party concerning 
either: 
(i) the sale of all or a portion of the outstanding stock or 
assets of the Company# or 
(ii) the acquisition, consolidation or merger of the company. 
Our arrangements with you in connection therewith shall be 
as follows: 
1) Boettcher shall commence its activity following 
acceptance and approval of this agreement by the 
Company. 
2) Boettcher shall work with the Company in the preparation 
of a memorandum (the "Offering Memorandum"). This 
Offering Memorandum will describe and analyze the 
Company, its operations, management, current financial 
data and other appropriate information. The Offering 
Memorandum will be used in discussions with prospective 
purchasers and its form and content shall be subject to 
approval by the Company. Subject to the terms hereof, 
the Company and Boettcher shall have the unrestricted 
right to use the Offering Memorandum during the term of 
this agreement. The Company understands and confirms 
EXHIBIT -_ ft-fifi o p - * 
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(i) that Boettcher will he u liny and relying on data, 
material and information presented in the Offering Memorandum 
furnished to Boettcher by the Company and its employees and 
representatives and (ii) that Boettcher does not*assume 
responsibility for independently verifying the information 
the Offering Memorandum* The Company hereby represents and 
warrants to Boettcher that the Offering Memorandum as 
approved by the Company will not contain any untrue statement 
of a material fact or omit to state any material fact 
necessary to make the statements therein not misleading. 
ttcner understands the confide n 11 a 1 i :t c 1 1 :it in e o f t h I s p r o j e c t 
• will work with you to maintain the • r- : i il::i dentiality you 
.:t. If any companies, entities, or individuals shoul d 
be excluded as potential purchasers due to the 
confidentiality of the information, the Company shall 
promptly notify Boettcher in writing of these exclusions. 
Except for such stated exclusions and the exclusion specified 
in paragraph 6, Boettcher shall be allowed tc distribute the 
Offering Memorandum to any party that it reasonably deems to 
be a prospective purchaser of the Company. All 
correspondence from Boettcher to the Company related to the 
transaction shall be marked "Confidential* and delivered to 
Reed Watkins as attorney for the Company. 
4) Boettcher shall act as your representative on an exclusive 
basis for a period of four months from the date of the 
acceptance of this letter by you unless extended by mutual 
consent. Boettcher shall take reasonable and diligent action 
to complete the sale of the Company on a timely basis and 
agrees to give the Company bi-weekly oral updates of its 
activities and progress.. In this role, except as discussed 
in paragraph 6, Boettcher shall be the sole and exclusive 
representative of the company in connection with any 
negotiations or discussion with any person or entity 
• concerning any sale and any other acquisition, consolidation 
or merger of the stock or assets of the Company. In order 
that Boettcher can best coordinate efforts to effect the 
transaction satisfactorily to the Company during the terms of 
our retention hereunder, the Company agrees to initiate any 
discussions looking toward a possible sale, acquisition, 
consolidation or merger on! y through Boettcher. In the event 
the Company receives inquiries concerning the type of 
transaction dealt with in this letter, you will promptly so 
inform us when you become aware of such Inquiry, In the 
event that a proposed person or entity with whom you 
eventually conclude an agreement is referred to us by 
-3- 000 
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another party, all compensation due such party, which 
Boettcher has expressly agreed in writing to pay, shall be 
our responsibility. The Company will be responsible for any 
fees or commissions of any other type, including financial, 
legal, accounting or other advisers called upon, requested or 
retained by the Company, its officers, directors or 
Stockholders, and the Company agrees to pay all of its 
expenses in connection with any such transaction. 
5) Except as set forth in paragraph 6, Boettcher shall receive a 
fee for its services, which to the extent necessary will 
include but not be limited to, participation in the 
preparation of the Offering Memorandum, identification of a 
selling price acceptable to the seller, development of a 
marketing plan, a search for and screening of responsible 
purchasers, advising you as to the financial aspects of the 
proposed transaction, and assisting you in the negotiations 
between you and the prospective purchasers. This fee shall 
be based on the "Purchase Price" and payable from the Company 
in the event of an asset sale, merger, or acquisition or 
similar transaction of the Company, or from the Stockholders 
in the event of a stock sale, as follows: 
(i) 
(ii) 
(iii) 
(iv) 
(v) 
5% 
4% 
3% 
2% 
1% 
of 
of 
of 
of 
of 
any 
any 
any 
any 
any 
amount 
amount 
amount 
amount 
amount 
up to $999,999; 
from $1,000,000 
from $2,000,000 
from $3,000,000 
over $4,000,000. 
plus 
to $1,999,999; 
to $2,999,999; 
to $3,999,999; 
• 
plus 
plus 
plus 
For purposes of this agreement, the Purchase Price shall 
include cash, securities, and any corporate earnout received, 
by the Company or the Stockholders. If any portion of the 
Purchase Price is in the form of debt securities or stock, 
then that amount of the Purchase Price shall be based upon 
the fair market value of the debt or equity securities. The 
fair market value of equity securities shall be determined as 
follows: If any of the securities to be received are traded 
on a registered national exchange the fair market value of 
such securities shall be the closing bid price for such 
securities on the registered national exchange providing the 
primary or largest market in such securities on the last 
trading day prior to the day the sale is consummated; if any 
of the securities to be received are not traded on a 
registered national exchange but are quoted in the over-the-
counter market, the fair market value of such securities 
000289 
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shall be the average of the closing bid prices as reported by 
the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. for the 
previous ten consecutive trading days prior to the day the 
sale is consummated. 
"Earnout shall be defined as any caijh, secuiities, oi othei 
remuneration received as a result of the future performance 
of the Company, or as a result of any noncorapetef consultinqr 
or similar agreements entered into by any stockholder as a 
result of the sale. 
The final Purchase Price and all oLJjei terms and conditions 
of any transaction shall be subject to approval of the Board 
of directors and, If appropriate, the Stockholders of the 
Company, 
") The Company has previously contacted certain companies 
through other intermediaries regarding a possibles^fie ot or 
investment in the Company. The names of these ftfftities shall 
be provided in writing to Boettcher within itWousiness days 
of acceptance of this letter and shall not exceed ten 
companies. In the event a transaction of the type 
contemplated herein is completed with one of these parties, 
Boettcher shall receive a fee of $25,000 for services 
rendered. In all other cases, Boettcher shall act as the 
exclusive representative of the Company and if a transaction 
is completed with any entity not provided, Boettcher shall be 
entitled to the fees specified in paragraph 5. The Company 
agrees it will not provide any information prepared t^  
Boettcher tn these parties'. 
4 j Subject Lu paragraph 10 M i wf Hue fees to Boettcher shall be 
payable only if a transaction is closed, and shall be payable 
in cash in full at the closing of any such transaction, 
provided that any payments which are based on future earnings 
or other "earnout" formulas shall be paid to Boettcher at f lie 
time the future payments are received. Any such amounts 
shall be added to any amount previously paid in determining 
the Purchase Price and applying the above peicentaqe tee, 
I  Except a1 specifically stated in paragraph 10 ul Uu-
agreement, the above-described compensation shall be in ful]L 
payment for all services rendered by Boettcher & Company^nd 
in no event, and regardless of whether or not there is a 
closing, c;hal1 the Company he liable for any out-of-pocket 
expenses, or for the services of otheis whom Boettcher may 
employ to assist in the transaction. 
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9) After termination of this agreement for any reason, Boettcher 
will provide you with the list of names of parties we have 
contacted and with whom we have had discussions on your 
behalf. If within 12 months following the termination of the 
agreement, the Company consummates a transaction with any 
party which is stated on the aforementioned list, Boettcher 
shall be entitled to its full fee as set forth in this 
agreement,. 
10) This agreement may be terminated by the Company on the one 
hand, or by Boettcher on the other hand, at any time by 
written notice. In the event of the termination of this 
agreement by the Company and the Stockholders together prior 
to the four month period referred to in paragraph 4, the 
Company shall reimburse Boettcher for all its direct, out-of-
pocket expenses incurred in connection with this transaction; 
provided, however, if Boettcher becomes entitled to a fee 
r paragraphs 9fof this agreement, credit against that fee 
I shall De given for any fee paid and expenses reimbursed 
^^--w pursuant to this paragraph. Such payment of out-of-pocket 
(jt £ j expenses shall be due and payable within three days after 
v ^ notification by Boettcher to the Company to the amount of 
expenses incurred. 
11) In connection with the performance of the services described 
in this letter and any transaction which may arise as a 
result of such services, the Company agrees to indemnify 
Boettcher, its officers, employees and agents, and each 
person, if any, who controls Boettcher within the meaning of 
the Federal securities laws, harmless against and from any 
and all losses, claims, expenses, damages or liabilities to 
which Boettcher or any such officer, employee, agent or 
person becomes subject in connection with the transaction and 
services referred to in this agreement under any of the 
Federal or State securities laws or any other statute or 
common law or otherwise and to reimburse Boettcher and any 
such officer, agent, employee or person for any legal or 
other expenses (including the cost of separate counsel and 
any related investigation and preparation) incurred by 
Boettcher and any such officer, employee, agent or person 
arising out of or in connection herewith, whether cr not 
resulting in any liability insofar as such losses, claims, 
damages, expenses or liabilities arise out of or ai e based 
upon any untrue statement or alleged untrue statement of a 
material fact contained in the Offering Memorandum, or 
otherwise made by the Company, or arise out of or are based 
upon the omission or alleged omission to state a material 
fact required to be stated or necessary in order to make the 
statements made in the Offering Memorandum or by tte Company 
not misleading, 
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12) It is understood that if anj transaction is completed, 
Boettcher shall be entitled, at its expense, to place an 
announcement in such newspapers and periodicals as we desire, 
stating that Boettcher has acted as financial advisers in , / 
such transaction. Any such announcement shal 3 be in a form L ^  t *&*£>'& 
reasonably acceptable to the Company.. 
If the foregoing represents a correct statement of our 
agreement and understanding, please execute this agreement* If 
executed and delivered to Boettcher, a binding agreement shall 
thereupon ex 1 \\\ , ' 
Very truly youii ,, 
BOETTCHLlt k CUMl/'N i 
C-z^Tamesf Bode 
Vice President 
Corporate Finance Department 
^ 7->L. 
G. Michael Moore 
Senior Vice President 
Corporate Finance Department 
The above is hereby acknowledged 
and accepted: 
WON-DOOR CORPORATION 
_ L - X ^ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ By 
Office: 
Date: 
A44»™ t. 
* 
Apj} 2-v, n &<o 
"7 0::•' ?r 
ZLJIr. /?. J=-'r 
.--r-T.Inc. 
Mcv 1 2 , 1S86 
Fred Vclcansek 
The Republic Group 
iS5 South State, Suite 1050 
S*lt 7-A* <~'ty, LIT 84115 
Lair Fred: 
My ten choices for veiling r'rorj-!••-••!• r v.-ould be the following 
3 '.ever^^n buy-our; where the four nf us out together 
«_*«%. ^ « « » « « « . > »-»JU £ > J J-JL JL !>««• - *««• «—*..«— .4. L W M . W .-_«« «^4«v^ , « _ C A J L o v r «_*«<»_ 
i ••« V c i V I U K . X . H H I ( i r t c l b l e W l ( n L.U& i j . S c . < M «rt' i iniiri n i e S C J J d C 
^ ::..;•:•: chosen v-^ly Lcj^use I know so l i t t l e ZL-^Z the indust ry 
does. 
2. ._-.SCG C o r e . 
Z'. J: -Lm r r d i L e r Cor**"*. 
I :*:. • i be i n Id~ho z 
?u-c - ":6y .3: i n g . I would I 
a t ._:"J-?.I: i ; i ; v j . 
;?r. ~ay anc \ r i i i £>e r : .cx on 
"^.sit. w i t u yo'c
 f I r v , an^ J*.-' 
L i u l y y o u r s , 
EXHIBIT M 
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Capital Consultants, Inc. 
June 5, 1986 
Donald G. Calder 
c/o G. L. Ohrstrom & Co. 
540 Madison Avenue 
New York, NY 10222 
Dear Mr. Calder: 
Today, Sandy Baldwin of Dominick & Dominick called me 
regarding a company that my associates and I have available 
for sale. At Sandy's request I am providing you with finan-
cial statements and brief marketing brochures for your 
perusal. Sandy will provide you with a video tape which is 
excellent in representing the unique qualities of this company. 
This information is being delivered to you on a confidential 
basis and serves as your introduction to Won-Door Corporation, 
a privately held Utah corporation. It is my request that 
after you have had the opportunity to preliminarily review 
this information, that we have a conference call to review 
the financials and answer any specific questions you may have. 
If there is sufficient interest, we could then talk in terms 
of a meeting in Salt Lake City to introduce you to the prin-
cipals of the Company. 
Our agreement allows us to introduce Won-Door Corpora-
tion to a few select buyers. As stated above, this corpora-
tion is privately held and is the result of the efforts of a 
single family. Mr. Jay Smart, the founder and principal 
owner, has been responsible for the unique product development, 
and his son, Mr. Ron Smart, has developed an extremely talented 
organization for the manufacturing and distribution of that 
product. Ron has implemented successful procedures for 
purchasing, manufacturing, inventory, shipping, quality control, 
and marketing. This combination of talent and product results 
in the excellent financial position which the Company presently 
enjoys. 
Because the principals desire that the Company not be 
solicited on the open market, I hereby request that you only 
use these materials for your comoany's information. ~T~ 
EXHIBIT " -JJ " 
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I look forward to the possibility of working with you 
and feel that Won-Door Corporation is an excellent vehicle 
for us to explore and complete. I await your earliest response 
to this information. 
Respectfully, 
CAPITAL/CONSULTANTS, INC. 
BDC/dhs 
Enclosures 
cc: A. T. Baldwin, Jr. 
Irvin D. Bird, Jr. 
0DO,°q 
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May 21, 1986 
Reed A. Watkins 
Watkins & Fabcr 
2102 E. 300 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
Dear Rabd, 
This letter server, as formal notice to you of our list of prospective 
buyers for the Wen Doer Corporation. 
1. tics, T<z.y Corp. 
2. Capital Cons"a]tanto Inc . 
3. The Republic Group 
4. The Dallas Corp. 
5. Leucadia Inc . 
6. Weyerhaeuser Corp. 
7. Mi sec 
8. Peichtree Door, A Division of Indal Corp. 
9. Amstronq World Corp. 
30. TeZedyne Corp. 
11. D^ninick * Dcminick 
We appreciate your desire to work with us and hope that you know tiiat we 
are working diligently to effect the sale of your client's company. 
Personal Regards, 
Frederick W. Volcansek 
Vice President 
The Republic Group 
cc: Bryant D. Craguu 
Irvin D. Bird Jr. 
Mark E. McSwain 
JW/stc 
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DANIEL L BEWMAN 
PATRICIA A. O'MORKC 
OOUCLAS J PA«RY 
PEGGY A TOM5IC 
• LAKE S. ATKJN 
THOMAS A. MITCHELL 
LAW OPFICCS 
BERMAN & O'RORKE 
A PROVISIONAL CORPORATION 
• UITE ItSO 
SO SOUTH MAIN STREET 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH *4\AA 
TCLCPMOMC l«Ol) M9-UOO 
TtlffCO*Cft OK>0 S S I * * ! * 
O. FRANK WILKINS 
OF COUNSEL 
August 20, 1986 
Reed A. Watkins, Esq. 
Watkins & Faber 
2102 East 3300 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84109 
Dear Mr, Watkins: 
RE: The Republic Group/Won-Door 
I am writing in confirmation of our telephone 
conversation of last week and your assurance that you 
recognized your obligation to The Republic Group if Leucadia or 
any of the other qualified ten listed companies acquires an 
interest in Won-Door. 
I have reviewed the documents and this matter with Irv 
Bird and after confirmation with you, my undertanding is that: 
If one of the qualified companies, including Leucadia, 
purchases an interest in Won-Door, The Republic Group 
is entitled to a commission. The commission is based 
on a fee of $250,000 per 22% of Won-Door purchased, 
thus if 100% of Won-Door is purchased by one of the 
qualified corporations then The Republic Group should 
be entitled to a $1,000,000 fee. 
If that does not comport with your understanding I would 
appreciate hearing immediately so that I can discuss this 
matter with my client. 
My understanding is that Leucadia has been negotiating 
very seriously with Won-Door and that last week after examining 
the books they made an offer. If this offer is accepted The 
Republic Group would be entitled to its fees. 
0 0 01 26 
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August 20, 1986 
Thank you for your cooperation in this matter. I will 
assure my client that there is no misunderstanding on the 
agreement. 
DJP:cc 
0008p 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the <2j day of January, 1993,1 caused a four (4) copies 
of Appellant's Brief (as corrected) to be mailed, first class postage prepaid to the following: 
Walter F. Faber, Jr., Esq. 
WATKINS & FABER 
2102 East 3300 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
Jeffrey M. Jones, Esq. 
David E. Hardy, Esq. 
Michael L. Dowdle, Esq. 
ALLEN, NELSON, HARDY & EVANS 
215 South State Street, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Richard Rappaport Esq. 
Cohne, Rappaport & Segal 
525 East 100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Robert G. Norton 
Attorney at Law 
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